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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
A common feature of tax law is to distinguish between debt and equity and provide for 
asymmetric tax treatment. Under domestic tax law the return on equity, i.e. dividends, is in 
general not deductible for the distributing company. This non-deductibility of equity returns is 
supposed to encourage companies to reinvest distributable profits. However, to avoid 
economic double taxation on received dividends, usually some relief is given for the 
shareholder by way of credit or exemption method. Return on debt, i.e. interest, on the other 
hand is in general deductible for the borrower and taxed at the level of the lender.1 
International taxation also distinguishes between debt and equity, as dividends are primarily 
taxed in the source state and interest in the residence state and lower withholding taxes are 
levied on interest than on dividends.2 In conclusion, tax law gives incentives for debt 
financing. 
However, the distinction between debt and equity stems from corporate law and accounting 
provisions. Tax law is not about the function of debt as a safeguard for third party liabilities.3 
But as debt financing is subject to preferential tax treatment, it can be used as a tax avoidance 
scheme against the background of tax competition and lack of harmonization to shift profits 
from high-tax jurisdiction to low-tax jurisdictions. Profits are transferred by way of debt with 
the interest expenses being deductible in the high-tax jurisdiction and the corresponding 
interest income being taxable in a low-tax jurisdiction. For groups this can significantly lower 
the overall effective taxation.4 Empirical evidence has shown that subsidiaries in high-tax 
jurisdictions are more often financed by intra-group debt. As the decision-making of 
companies is affected by the tax-preferential treatment of debt financing, it can lead to 
artificial tax-driven financing structures which might not be at arm’s length and lead to tax 
revenues losses.5 As tax authorities want to protect their tax revenues, they implement 
legislation to prevent the erosion of the tax base and consequential tax revenues losses, e.g. 
                                                 
1
 A Storck, ‘The Financing of Multinational Companies and Taxes: An Overview of the Issues and Suggestions 
for Solutions and Improvements’, Bulletin for International Taxation, vol. 65, no. 1, 2011, p. 27, retrieved 
28 January 2013, IBFD Tax Research Platform, C P Knöller, ’The Efficacy of Thin Capitalization Rules and 
Their Barriers: An Analysis from the UK and German Perspective’, INTERTAX, vol. 39, no. 6/7, 2011, p. 319, 
retrieved 13 March 2013, Kluwer Law International Online and T J C van Dongen, ‘Thin Capitalization 
Legislation and the EU Corporate Tax Directives’, European Taxation, vol. 52, no. 1, 2012, p. 20, retrieved 
21 January 2013, IBFD Tax Research Platform. 
2
 A Cordewener, ‘Company Taxation, Cross-Border Financing and Thin Capitalization in the EU Internal 
Market: Some Comments on Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH’, European Taxation, vol. 43, no. 4, 2003, p. 113, 
retrieved 21 March 2013, IBFD Tax Research Platform, A Storck (n. 1), p. 27, A Hilling, ‘Sweden’, IFA 
Cahier – The Debt Equity Conundrum, vol. 97B, 2012, p. 693, retrieved 6 May 2013, IBFD Tax Research 
Platform and W Schön, ‘The Distinct Equity of the Debt-Equity Distinction’, Bulletin for International 
Taxation, vol. 66, no. 9, 2012, p. 494, retrieved 27 January 2013, IBFD Tax Research Platform. 
3
 W Schön (n. 2), p. 496. 
4
 C P Knöller (n. 1), pp. 319 – 320. 
5
 S Webber, ‘Thin Capitalization and Interest Deduction Rules: A Worldwide Survey’, Tax Notes International, 
vol. 60, 2010, p. 689, retrieved 4 April 2013, Tax Analysts and C P Knöller (n. 1), pp. 320 - 321. 
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thin capitalization rules, interest barriers or general anti-avoidance legislation.6 The terms 
‘thin’ capitalization and ‘hidden’ capitalization refer in tax law to excessive intra-group debt 
financing, which is in substance equity, as tax avoidance scheme.7 Therefore thin 
capitalization rules are implemented to prevent excessive debt financing.8 Despite substantial 
differences in the design of such rules, their common purpose is the reduction of the distortive 
effect of tax-favoured debt financing.9 
In the 1990s many industrialized countries introduced such thin capitalization rules as anti-
avoidance measure for abusive debt financing. The early thin capitalization rules focused on 
debt loaned or guaranteed by foreign group companies.10 Due to potential export of interest 
income, thin capitalization is especially problematic in cross-border situations, whereas 
extending the scope of thin capitalization rules to domestic situations, leads to unnecessary 
constraints on domestic taxpayers.11 However, this is often discriminatory and therefore not 
compatible with EU Law, as will be discussed in this paper. Some thin capitalization regimes 
focus on resident and non-resident affiliated companies, like Sweden, whereas others apply in 
general to all debt, like in Germany. As all thin capitalization regimes, interest deduction 
limitation rules in their role as specific anti-avoidance legislation also face the problem to 
distinguish between legitimate and abusive financing structures. In its case law, the ECJ has 
developed the principle of the prohibition of abuse.12 Thus, legislators face the challenge to 
implement appropriate and proportional thin capitalization provisions that do not distort 
legitimate financial decision-making.13 
1.2 Purpose 
In light of the recent inquiry by the European Commission in January 2013 concerning the 
compatibility of the Swedish interest deduction limitations rules, an EU law compatibility 
analysis proves to be relevant.14 Additionally the Swedish Companies’ Committee 
(Företagskommittén) was in 2011 assigned the task to research whether a fundamental change 
                                                 
6
 L Brosens, ‘Thin Capitalization Rules and EU Law’, EC Tax Review, vol. 13, no. 4, 2004, p. 188, retrieved 
13 March 2013, Kluwer Law International Online, A Storck (n. 1), p. 28 and C Elliffe, ‘Unfinished Business: 
Domestic Thin Capitalization Rules and the Non-Discrimination Article in the OECD Model’, Bulletin for 
International Taxation, vol. 67, no. 1, 2013, p. 28, retrieved 21 January 2013, IBFD Tax Research Platform. 
7
 C Brokelind, ‘Cross Border Intra-Group Financing in France after the Conseil d’Etat Decisions of 
30 December 2003’, EC Tax Review, vol. 13, no. 4, 2004, p. 181, retrieved 13 March 2013, Kluwer Law 
International Online and C Elliffe (n. 6), p. 26. 
8
 L Brosens (n. 6), p. 188 and C Elliffe (n. 6), p. 28. 
9
 A Storck (n. 1), p. 36 and C P Knöller (n. 1), p. 321. 
10
 K Nakhai, R Stricof and O Thoemmes, ‘Thin Capitalization Rules and the Non-Discrimination Principles – An 
Analysis of Thin Capitalization Rules in Light of the Non-Discrimination Principle in the EC Treaty, Double 
Tax Treaties and Friendship Treaties’, INTERTAX, vol. 32, no. 3, 2004, p. 126, retrieved 21 March 2013, 
Kluwer Law International Online and K von Brocke and E G Perez, ‘Group Financing: From Thin 
Capitalization to Interest Deduction Limitation Rules’, International Transfer Pricing Journal, vol. 16, no. 1, 
2009, p. 29, retrieved 21 January 2013, IBFD Tax Research Platform. 
11
 C P Knöller (n. 1), p. 322 and C Elliffe (n. 6), p. 28. 
12
 Case C-110/99 Emsland-Stärke GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Jonas [2000] ECR I-01569 and 
R de la Feria, ’Prohibition of Abuse of (Community) Law: The Creation of a New General Principle of EC 
Law Through Tax’, Common Market Law Review, vol. 45, no. 2, 2008, pp. 395 – 441, retrieved 4 April 2013, 
Kluwer Law International Online. 
13
 C P Knöller (n. 1), pp. 317-318, 320. 
14
 European Commission, EU Pilot 4437/13/TAXU – Sweden, 9 January 2013. 
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of the Swedish interest deduction limitation would be more appropriate. Any results and a 
potential proposal are expected to be published by 31 March 2014.15 During the preparatory 
work to the amendments of the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules as of 1 January 
2013, several parties have argued in favour of a shift to an EBITDA-model.16 Such an 
approach to limit interest deductibility has growing popularity and has been implemented in 
Germany in an innovative manner.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relevant provisions of Swedish and German tax 
law and to study the case law of the ECJ in order to analyze whether the rules potentially 
infringe EU law. The paper also analyzes how appropriate the interest deduction limitation 
rules are to fulfil the legislators’ intended purpose to prevent tax base erosion. 
1.3 Method and Materials 
This paper will conduct a traditional comparative law analysis by studying how the conflicts 
of tax base erosion by preferred debt-financing are resolved in two different countries and will 
ask how appropriate the solutions are to their intended purpose. Experience in this field has 
shown that it is best to first present the relevant legal provisions without judgment as a basis 
for a critical comparison.17 The primary focus of this paper is the compatibility with EU law. 
This will be based on an analysis of ECJ case law. The choice of case law is based on their 
relevancy for the analysis of interest deduction limitation rules. The relevancy of the cases has 
been derived from the discussion of the cases in articles devoted to thin capitalization and 
interest deduction limitation rules.  
The relevant domestic law provisions were the starting point for this paper. Despite the 
German law provision, all material used in this paper was written in English or Swedish to 
guarantee that sources can be reviewed. The author is aware that the lack of German literature 
on the German interest deduction limitation rules affects the results of this paper’s 
comparison. The thesis will analyse domestic sources of law, ECJ case law and material, such 
as preparatory work and scholars’ and practitioners’ articles, devoted to the topic in order to 
assess the compatibility of the rules and enable a critical comparison. In order to assess the 
appropriateness of the domestic interest deduction limitation rules the author will consider 
how appropriate the domestic interest deduction limitation rules are for protecting the 
domestic tax base. Therefore it will be considered whether the rules can easily be 
circumvented and in how far the rules apply to non-abusive arrangements. 
1.4 Delimitations 
The selection of the compared countries is not random. Within the framework of the recent 
amendments of the Swedish interest deduction limitations rules as of 1 January 2013 and the 
                                                 
15
 Regeringen, Kommittédirektiv 2011:1, 13 January 2011, p. 4, retrieved 4 April 2013, http://www. 
regeringen.se and Regeringen, Tilläggsdirektiv till Företagsskattekommittén 2011:1, 15 November 2012, 
retrieved 22 May 2013, http://www.regereringen.se. 
16
 Finansdepartementets Lagrådsremiss, Effektivare Ränteavdragsbegränsningar, 7 June 2012, p. 38. EBITDA 
(Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation and Amortization) is a performance measure based on a 
company’s financial accounting. 
17
 Kötz and K Zweigert, Introduction to Comparative Law, 1995, 3rd edn., Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 4, 6. 
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research of the Swedish Companies’ Committee for a fundamental change of the interest 
deduction limitation rules, an EBITDA-model has been suggested.18 Such an EBITDA-model 
has been introduced in Germany in late 2007. Following the German model other countries, 
e.g. Italy, Spain and Portugal, have also introduced EBITDA-based interest deduction 
limitation rules. The German rules have been chosen for the comparison with the Swedish 
rules as they are implemented over a relatively long period without any fundamental 
amendments. The German rules are therefore already widely discussed in literature which 
provides a good research basis for a comparison. Additionally, both Sweden and Germany are 
civil law countries and high-tax jurisdictions that face the challenge of dealing with 
significant tax base erosion in the framework of EU law. 
The author acknowledges that not the whole picture of interest deduction limitation rules can 
be covered. It is also not in the scope of this paper to define and discuss what ‘interests’ are 
under the domestic legislations at issue. Due to the enquiry by the European Commission 
against Sweden and the ECJ case law on thin capitalization, this paper will focus on the 
freedom of establishment and will not discuss the free movement of capital. It will 
deliberately omit possible consequences of tax treaties, as these are not part of EU law. It is 
also not in scope of this paper to discuss the compatibility of thin capitalization regimes with 
the Parent and Subsidiary Directive19 or the Interest and Royalties Directive20. Although thin 
capitalization rules are per se different than interest deduction limitation rules, they are 
responses to the same problem. In Germany, for example, the interest deduction limitation 
rules substituted the previous thin capitalization rules. Therefore, for the purpose of this 
paper, the term ‘thin capitalization (regime)’ will also cover interest deduction limitation 
rules. The paper is based on research until 9 May 2013 and therefore considers only material 
published up to that date. 
1.5 Outline 
In line with the comparative legal method, following the introduction the national law 
provisions of Sweden and Germany will be presented in Chapter 2. Following this, Chapter 3 
will provide an overview of the relevant ECJ case law and then assess the compatibility with 
EU law of the Swedish and German interest deduction limitation rules. In Chapter 4 it will be 
analysed in how far the provisions are proportionate and appropriate to the purpose intended 
by the legislator. A critical comparison, being the purpose of this paper, will be conducted in 
Chapter 5 and the conclusion of the author will be drawn in Chapter 6. 
2. Domestic Law Provisions 
The thin capitalization rules of the 1990s usually set up debt-equity ratios, which could also 
operate as ‘safe havens’. If the ratio was exceeded, the deductibility of interest expenses was 
                                                 
18
 Finansdepartementets Lagrådsremiss, Effektivare Ränteavdragsbegränsningar, 7 June 2012, p. 38. 
19
 Parents-Subsidiary Directive 2003/123/EC. 
20
 Interests and Royalties Directive 2003/49/EC. 
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either directly disallowed or indirectly through reclassification as dividends.21 However, 
reclassification may lead to double taxation due to qualification conflicts between countries.22 
But fixed debt-equity ratios have also been criticized as they apply automatically without 
distinguishing between the nature and situation of businesses or whether the financing is 
abusive.23 Even upon combination with the arm’s length principle, it has been questioned in 
how far fixed ratios can prevent abusive debt financing.24 Multinational groups, as studies 
have shown, can easily circumvent thin capitalization rules based on fixed ratios, e.g. by 
temporarily increasing the equity just before the balance sheet date. Instead of trying to 
control the capital structure of companies by fixed debt-equity ratios, it is more straight-
forward to limit the deductibility of interest expenses in order to retain tax revenues.25 Such 
interest deduction limitation rules have been implemented, inter alia, in Germany and 
Sweden. In order to assess the Swedish and German approach to interest deduction limitation, 
the legislation in force will be presented. 
2.1 Swedish Law 
Compared with many other industrialized states26, Sweden was rather late with introducing 
legislation specifically targeted at abusive debt-financing27. After the Swedish Supreme 
Administrative Court held in late 200728 that the Swedish general anti-avoidance legislation is 
not applicable to certain tax planning schemes with interest expenses, Sweden faced an 
immediate need for thin capitalization rules to prevent such tax avoidance29. Due to this 
sudden need for thin capitalization rules, based on research conducted primarily by the 
Swedish tax authorities, which had shown that tax in Sweden was avoided with help of 
interest expenses at a large scale, Sweden introduced interest deduction limitation rules 
(Ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna) as of 1 January 2009.30 The Swedish approach focuses 
on limiting the deduction of interest expenses incurred on debt that finances intra-group 
acquisitions of shareholdings. Contrary to the tax authorities’ initial proposal, following 
massive critique, the rules include two exceptions to ensure that non-abusive transactions 
                                                 
21
 L Brosens (n. 6), p. 190, K Nakhai, R Stricof and O Thoemmes (n. 10), p. 126 and K von Brocke and 
E G Perez (n. 10), p. 29. 
22
 E.g. the shareholder’s state might not recognize the reclassification or the subsidiary’s state might levy the 
higher withholding tax applicable to dividends. L Brosens (n. 6), p. 203, K Nakhai, R Stricof and 
O Thoemmes (n. 10), p. 126 and T J C van Dongen (n. 1), pp. 20 – 21. 
23
 L Brosens (n. 6), p. 190, S Webber (n. 5), p. 684 and C P Knöller (n. 1), p. 335. 
24
 L Brosens (n. 6), p. 211. 
25
 K von Brocke and E G Perez (n. 10), p. 29 and S Webber (n. 5), pp. 703 – 704. 
26
 K von Brocke and E G Perez (n. 10), p. 29. 
27
 Regeringen, Budgetproposition 2012/13:1, 20 September 2012, p. 241, retrieved 4 April 2013, http://www. 
regeringen.se. 
28
 Regeringsrätten, RÅ 2007, ref. 84-85 (‘Industrivärdendomarna’). 
29
 L Samuelson, ‘HFD Avvaktar EU-Domstolen om Ränteavdragsbegränsning’, Svensk Skattetidning, no. 6/7, 
2011, p. 558, retrieved 21 March 2013, Zeteo, M Dahlberg, ‘Sweden’s Proposal on the Deduction of Interest 
on Intercorporate Loans’, Tax Notes International, vol.  66, 2012, p. 1037, retrieved 4 April 2013, Tax 
Analysts, A Hilling (n. 2), p. 699 and A Hultqvist, ‘Affärsmässigt Motiverad’, Svensk Skattetidning, no. 2, 
2012, p. 122, retrieved 21 March 2013, Zeteo. 
30
 Regeringen, Budgetproposition 2012/13:1, 20 September 2012, p. 241, retrieved 4 April 2013, 
http://www.regeringen.se, M Dahlberg, ‘Sweden: Court OKs Limitations on Deductibility of Intercompany 
Interest’, Tax Notes International, vol. 65, 2012, p. 276, retrieved 4 April 2013, Tax Analysts and M Hilling, 
‘Är Det Möjligt Att Utforma EU-Förenliga Skatteflyktsregler?’, Svensk Skattetidning, no. 10, 2012, p. 823, 
retrieved 21 March 2013, Zeteo. 
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should not be affected.31 However, both the tax authorities and the government, came to the 
conclusion that the rules still offer many opportunities for tax planning with interest expenses. 
Therefore, with the amendments as of 1 January 2013 the rules were restricted even more, 
which is only one in a line of amendments to the rules.32 Further restrictions on interest 
deductibility broaden the tax base and help to counter-finance the reduction of the corporate 
tax rate.33 As the government sees an immediate need to amend the rules especially with 
regard to intra-group debt it concluded that there is no time to wait for the proposal from the 
Companies’ Committee.34 
Swedish tax law (ch. 16 para. 1 SITA) generally provides for full deduction of interest 
expenses. However, ch. 24 paras. 10a – 10f SITA limit the deductibility. According to the 
main rule in para. 10b interest payments to affiliated companies are not deductible, unless one 
of the exceptions provided for in paras. 10d and 10e applies. Companies are seen as affiliated 
if either one of the companies, directly or indirectly, has a substantial influence over the other 
company, or if the companies are under common control.35 Previously the rules required 
‘determinative’ influence over a company. Therefore, the scope of the rules has been 
expanded and will also affect cases of shareholdings just below 50%.36 
Interest expenses on intra-group debt, whose deductibility is prohibited by para. 10b, can 
nevertheless be deducted if the corresponding interest income is taxed with at least 10% in the 
residence state of the beneficial owner if it was his only income. As of 1 January 2013 even 
companies that do not fulfil this hypothetical 10%-test can deduct their interest expenses if the 
beneficial owner is subject to Swedish yield tax or a comparable tax, provided that during the 
tax year the debt’s interest rate has on average not exceeded 250% of the average state bond 
interest rate of the previous calendar year. The extension of the 10%-rule is targeted at 
Swedish life insurance companies and pension trusts subject to Swedish yield tax. However, 
these exceptions do not apply if the obligation is mainly motivated by tax reasons of the 
group.37 The counter-exception has been introduced because tax planning schemes have been 
structured in such way that the 10%-test is fulfilled.38 
If the 10%-rule is not applicable, intra-group interest expenses can still be deductible if the 
interest expenses are primarily based on sound business reasons.39 The second exception, 
                                                 
31
 R Hellenius, ’De Nya Ränteavdragsbegränsningarna’, Svensk Skattetidning, no. 2, 2009, pp. 166 – 167, 
retrieved 21 March 2013, Zeteo, T Andersson and C Carneborn, ’Något om Ränteavdragsbegränsnings-
reglernas Räckvidd och Innebörd’, Svensk Skattetidning, no. 10, 2010, p. 972, retrieved 4 April, Zeteo and 
T Andersson, ’Ränteavdragsbegränsning i Bolagssektorn, Några Erfarenheter Två År Senare’, Svensk 
Skattetidning, no. 4, 2011, p. 358, retrieved 21 March 2013, Zeteo. 
32
 Finansdepartementets Lagrådsremiss, Effektivare Ränteavdragsbegränsningar, 7 June 2012, p. 1 and 
Regeringen, Budgetproposition 2012/13:1, supra n. 32, p. 229. 
33
 Finansdepartementet, EU Pilot 4437/13/TAXU – Sweden, 20 March 2013, p. 6. 
34
 Finansdepartementets Lagrådsremiss, Effektivare Ränteavdragsbegränsningar, 7 June 2012, p. 3. 
35
 Ch. 24, para. 10a SITA. 
36
 Regeringen, Budgetproposition 2012/13:1, supra n. 32, p. 239. 
37
 Ch. 24 para. 10d SITA. There is no general consensus on what is meant by the term ‘beneficial owner’. The 
term ‘beneficial owner’ in general describes a person or entity that obtains economic benefits, e.g. interest 
income, without legal ownership. 
38
 Finansdepartementets Lagrådsremiss, Effektivare Ränteavdragsbegränsningar, 7 June 2012, p. 38 and 
Regeringen, Budgetproposition 2012/13:1, supra n. 32, p. 219. 
39
 Ch. 24, para. 10e SITA. 
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which is a business purpose test, only applies to beneficial owners that are resident within the 
EEA or in a state that has concluded a double tax treaty with Sweden covering all income by 
which he is covered.40 If the underlying debt financed the acquisition of a company that was 
or became afterwards a group company, the exception is only applicable if the acquisition 
itself was also primarily based on sound business reasons. This also covers an intra-group 
debt that replaces a third-party debt used for financing such an acquisition.41 Upon assessing 
business reasons, it should be taken into account whether contribution by the lender or any 
other affiliated company could have been used for financing.42 This exception should prevent 
the exceptional cases where transactions are commercially motivated despite very low 
taxation to be included in the anti-abuse legislation.43 
The general prohibition of deduction also applies, unless the exception under para. 10f is 
applicable, to interest payments to non-affiliated companies, if the lender or an affiliated 
company of the lender is indebted to the borrower or an affiliated company of the borrower, if 
the underlying debt is given in connection with the other obligation and is financing the 
acquisition of shares in company that either before or after the acquisition is a group company 
(‘back-to-back’ loans).44 Interest payments with regard to back-to-back loans are nevertheless 
deductible, if either the corresponding interest income is taxed in accordance with para. 10d 
and the debt is not primarily tax-driven, or if both acquisition and interest expenses have 
mainly business reasons. However, this business purpose test also only applies to beneficial 
owners that are resident within the EEA or in a state that has concluded a double tax treaty 
with Sweden covering all income by which he is covered.45 
2.2 German Law 
Just like Sweden, Germany tried to deal with thin capitalization cases with the help of general 
anti-avoidance provisions in the beginning. After such practice was ruled unlawful by the 
Federal Tax Court in 1992, specific thin capitalization rules were introduced as of 1 January 
1994.46 The thin capitalization rules until 2003 were targeted at abusive financing by foreign 
shareholders and related parties.47 The rules in force in 1997/1998, that were slightly amended 
in 2001 upon change from the imputation system to a classical corporation tax system, were at 
issue in Lankhorst-Hohorst48, the most relevant case for thin capitalization before the ECJ.49 
Because the ECJ ruled that the German thin capitalization rules infringed the freedom of 
establishment, they were amended as of 1 January 2004 and applied to both domestic and 
cross-border situations. However, it was argued that they were no longer targeted at 
preventing abusive financing structures.50 Under these rules interest payments made to 
                                                 
40
 Ch. 24, para. 10e SITA. 
41
 Ch. 24, para. 10e SITA. 
42
 Ch. 24, para. 10e SITA. 
43
 Finansdepartementets Lagrådsremiss, Effektivare Ränteavdragsbegränsningar, 7 June 2012, p. 64. 
44
 Ch. 24 para. 10c SITA. 
45
 Ch. 24 para. 10f SITA. 
46
 A Cordewener (n. 2), p. 107. 
47
 K von Brocke and E G Perez (n. 10), p. 30. 
48
 C-324/00 Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v Finanzamt Steinfurt [2002] ECR I-11779. 
49
 K Nakhai, R Stricof and O Thoemmes (n. 10), p. 127. 
50
 K Nakhai, R Stricof and O Thoemmes (n. 10), p. 127 and K von Brocke and E G Perez (n. 10), p. 31. 
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shareholders holding more than 25% of shares were reclassified as dividends, unless they 
were at arm’s length. These rules applied to interest payment above EUR 250,000 and if the 
safe haven debt-equity ratio of 1.5:1 was exceeded.51 As the rules were not changed in 
substance, it was common consensus that Lankhorst-Hohorst also applied to the amended 
rules.52 In addition was the difference in treatment between resident and non-resident lenders 
not fully removed as deemed dividends paid to German shareholders were tax exempt to 95%, 
whereas foreign lenders were subject to withholding tax at 25% or the reduced treaty 
withholding tax rate.53 
Following the critique, Germany introduced an innovative interest deduction limitation rule as 
of 25 June 2007. With the new rule, the German government followed a trend in international 
tax law away from reclassification of interest for the sake of restricting deductibility of 
interest payments when certain conditions are met.54 The ‘interest barrier’ (Zinsschranke) was 
introduced in the framework of the 2008 Tax Reform that aimed at increasing incentives for 
investments and doing business in Germany. The enacted tax reliefs, inter alia a reduction of 
the tax rate, were partially to be financed by broadening the tax base with the help of the new 
interest deduction limitation rule, although such a rule should be intended as anti-abuse 
legislation.55 
The German thin capitalization rules are embedded in sec. 4h GITA in combination with 
sec. 8a GCITA. According to the general rule, any interest expenses that exceed the amount 
of incurred interest income (so-called ‘net interest expenses’) are limited in their deductibility 
as a business expense up to an amount of 30% of taxable EBITDA.56 Contrary to the old rules 
the interest barrier limits the deductibility of interest expenses on debt from all sources. 
However, for corporations subject to sec. 8a GCITA related party debt is treated more 
restrictively. The German thin capitalization rules look at the interest expense of a ‘business’. 
The term ‘business’ is used to describe a corporation or a partnership. However, companies 
forming a German fiscal unity (Organschaft) are also regarded as single business.57 
The rules provide for an EBITDA carry-forward, i.e. the rules allow to carry forward any part 
of the 30% taxable EBITDA that has not been utilized by net interest expenses for five 
financial years.58 The EBITDA carry-forward was introduced retrospectively due to the 
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financial crisis in order to relieve companies that were previously profitable.59 It is up to date 
still in place and has not been abandoned. If however the net interest expenses exceed the 
30% taxable EBITDA threshold, the exceeding net interest expenses can be carried forward 
indefinitely.60 Thus, the deductibility of interest is only denied temporarily. But any non-
utilized carry-forwards will be forfeited upon ceasing or transfer of the business.61 
Interest expenses are nonetheless fully deductible if any of the three exceptions in sec. 4h 
para. 2 GITA applies. In order to relieve the burden on small businesses, a de minimis 
exemption provides for full deductibility if the net interest expenses do not exceed EUR 3m.62 
Upon introduction the threshold was EUR 1m but was retrospectively increased due to the 
financial crisis. Although initially limited to 2008 and 2009, the new government 
implemented the increased threshold indefinitely to make the interest deduction limitation 
rules less strict.63 The main rule limiting deductibility is also not applicable if the non-group 
affiliation exemption in sec. 4h para. 2 (b) GITA is fulfilled. This exception applies if the 
business does not or only partially belong to a group of companies. In this context the term 
‘group’ does not refer to a tax group, but a business belongs to a group if it is or could be 
included in a group’s consolidated financial statements. Companies are also part of a group if 
they are under common control.64 The third exemption, the escape clause, applies if the 
business’s equity ratio is either equal or higher than the group’s overall equity ratio. However, 
an equity ratio that is by 2 percentage points lower is tolerated. The equity ratios are 
calculated based on the previous balance sheets that are uniformly reported in accordance 
with IFRS, or any EU- or US-GAAP.65 
Corporations are subject to additional restrictions. The two counter exceptions of 
sec. 8a GCITA disallow the application of the non-affiliation exception and the equity 
comparison in case of harmful shareholder debt financing. This is given when the business 
cannot provide evidence that less than 10% of the net interest expenses are paid to 
shareholders that, directly or indirectly, hold more than 25% of shares in the business or any 
related party of such a shareholder, as well as any third party that has recourse to the former 
two parties. Moreover can the escape clause only be applied if none of the legal entities, 
domestic and foreign, of the group provides for harmful shareholder debt financing, excluding 
intra-group financing.66 
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3. Compatibility with EU Law 
3.1 EU Law Framework 
Currently there is no secondary EU law, e.g. a directive, on thin capitalization. Therefore most 
insight on the effect of EU Law on interest deduction limitation rules can be gained from the 
ECJ’s case law. As already mentioned, Lankhorst-Hohorst is the most relevant case for thin 
capitalization and interest deduction limitation rules. The ECJ ruled that the German thin 
capitalization rules in force in 1997/1998 infringed the freedom of establishment.67 The 
freedom of establishment is one of the fundamental Treaty freedoms set out in 
Art. 49 TFEU.68 It prohibits not only discrimination, but any restriction that prohibits, 
impedes, or renders less attractive the exercise of the freedom of establishment.69 
In Lankhorst-Hohorst the German company Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH paid interest to its 
Dutch grandparent Lankhorst Taselaar BV on a loan granted in order to rescue it due to its 
highly indebtedness. The tax authorities argued that such a loan that was given without 
securities and supported by a letter of support waiving repayment in favour of third party 
claims could not have been obtained from a third party, i.e. it was in fact equity.70 The interest 
expenses were, upon exceeding a certain debt-equity ratio, reclassified as dividend. Although 
this reclassification was not directly linked to nationality, the ECJ ruled that the rules were 
discriminatory and were an unjustifiable obstacle to the freedom of establishment.71 Interest 
paying subsidiaries were treated differently based on the residency of their parent company, 
because the reclassification only applied to interest payment to companies not entitled to 
corporation tax credit. Foreign companies as well as German corporations exempt from 
corporate income tax were not entitled to such a tax credit.72 Although the rules also applied 
to certain German taxpayers, the rules applied in practice primarily to foreign shareholders 
and were thus discriminatory.73 
It can be concluded from Lankhorst-Hohorst that even thin capitalization rules that indirectly 
discriminate resident and non-resident creditors can infringe the freedom of establishment.74 
Following this judgment, several Member States amended their thin capitalization rules as it 
was common to apply rules only to interest payments made to non-residents.75 In order to 
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comply with EU law, EU-resident companies have to be treated equally disadvantageously.76 
Therefore the legislators in the EU Member States have to choose between either accepting 
tax planning with interest expenses within the EU or restricting domestic cases.77 
For the understanding of the second case regarding thin capitalization rules, Thin Cap 
Group78 it is important to first take a look at Cadbury Schweppes79 which is the leading direct 
tax case for the EU law principle of prohibition of abuse.80 As was already mentioned, many 
thin capitalization rules try to distinguish between legitimate use and misuse of interest 
deduction provisions. The legal issue in Cadbury Schweppes was whether the establishment 
of companies in another Member States, which was regarded as a low-tax jurisdiction, was 
abusive.81 The ECJ transferred from the corporate law case Centros82 that companies may not 
take advantage of EU law, here the freedom of establishment, to circumvent their domestic 
provisions.83 However, a foreign establishment, or by extension the interest payment to a 
foreign establishment, cannot in itself give a presumption of abuse.84 The ECJ ruled that 
national measures can be justified by preventing tax avoidance, provided that they only apply 
to wholly artificial arrangements that are aimed at circumventing domestic legislation.85 
Therefore, in line with Cadbury Schweppes, a transaction is legitimate if it reflects economic 
reality, despite potential underlying tax motives.86 To determine whether an arrangement is 
artificial, it has to be assessed whether the accrual of the tax advantage (subjective criteria) is 
in compliance with the purpose of the provision (objective criteria). The objective criteria 
have to be ascertainable by third parties.87 
The justification ground of preventing abuse was accepted in Thin Cap Group which 
concerned interest payments from UK resident companies to non-resident group companies.88 
Generally the deductibility of interest payments was not limited in the same way if the 
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creditor was a domestic group company.89 In the test cases interest was paid to non-residents 
(EU or third state ultimate parents) with certain shareholdings that exceeded 75% that were 
affected by the recharacterization and following non-deductibility of interest payments.90 As 
the tax treatment differed depending on the residency of the related party, such measure 
restricts the freedom of establishment for EU-resident lenders.91 Contrary to Lankhorst-
Hohorst the British thin capitalization rules were justifiable as measures specifically targeting 
wholly artificial arrangements that do not reflect economic reality are allowed. But the ECJ 
stressed that foreign residency of a lender cannot give a general presumption of abuse.92 
Although the UK measure was appropriate to its underlying objective, the measure was not 
proportional.93 For thin capitalization rules to be proportional, two conditions were laid out. 
First, the taxpayer needs to be given the opportunity to provide evidence without 
unreasonable administrative requisites that the arrangement was commercially justified.94 
Second, reclassification of interest payments is only proportional for the amount that exceeds 
arm’s length.95  
Thus, from Thin Cap Group it can be concluded that thin capitalization rules can be justified 
by the prevention of tax avoidance. The problem with the German rules in Lankhorst-Hohorst 
was that they applied automatically without considering whether any actual abuse was present 
as they were not specifically targeted to prevent wholly artificial arrangements.96 The ECJ 
generally considers abuse to be given when an artificial arrangement is created to fulfil formal 
compliance with a provision’s conditions to obtain the advantages despite not being in line 
with the purpose of the law provision.97 It is, however, as the ECJ stated in Eurowings98 not 
abusive if taxpayers arrange their affairs in a way to profit from taxing differences between 
Member States, as long as such arrangements are not artificial.99 It follows from Thin Cap 
Group that deductibility of interest payment to affiliated companies cannot be denied if it the 
lender has a genuine economic activity and the interest is at arm’s length.100 In summary, thin 
capitalization rules must be limited to wholly artificial arrangement. However, neither intra-
group loans nor loans by foreign lenders in themselves can lead to a general avoidance 
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presumption.101 As both rulings deal with reclassified interest, it is even argued that such rules 
in general cannot comply with EU law which speaks in favour of interest deduction limitation 
rules.102 
The questions in Thin Cap Group were also referred under the free movement of capital.103 
Contrary to the freedom of establishment, the free movement of capital applies in third 
country situations. However, the ECJ ruled that thin capitalization rules affect shareholdings 
giving definite influence on company’s decisions and thus the freedom of establishment 
applies primarily. Any restrictions of the free movement of capital are an unavoidable 
consequence of the restricted freedom of establishment. Thus, the ECJ denied a separate 
examination.104 
Another case that has indirect relevance as it touched upon interest payments to non-residents 
is Scheuten Solar105. The case is interesting with regard to thin capitalization as the ECJ stated 
that the provisions of the Interests and Royalties Directive106 only concern the tax position of 
the lender, i.e. the interest creditor.107 The rule that was disputed in Scheuten Solar, which 
lead to economic double taxation, related to the interest debtor only. Therefore the Directive 
was not applicable and did not prohibit the legislation.108 As thin capitalization also leads to 
partial economic double taxation and applies to the interest debtor only, the ruling has an 
indirect impact which leads to the conclusion that thin capitalization rules are not covered by 
this Directive.109 In addition it is intended that the benefits of the Interest and Royalty 
Directive are not applicable to fraudulent or abusive arrangements.110 
3.2 EU Law Compatibility of the Swedish Rules 
Concerns regarding the compatibility of the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules with 
EU law have been raised already upon their introduction in 2009.111 The Swedish government 
has disclaimed any conflict of the Swedish rules with EU law. Due to several complaints, the 
European Commission has in January 2013 officially questioned Sweden about the EU law 
compliance of the national measure. The Swedish government continued to insist that the 
freedom of establishment is not restricted by the interest deduction limitation rules.112 
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The Swedish Supreme Administrative Court (Högsta Förvältningsdomstolen) has already 
dealt with the EU law compliance of the Swedish interest deduction limitation rules in several 
cases on which judgments were rendered on 30 November 2011. Against the background of 
the ECJ’s ruling in Scheuten Solar the Swedish Court confirmed that the Swedish rules do not 
infringe the Interest and Royalties Directive as they apply to the interest debtor.113 More 
importantly was the Swedish Court of the opinion that only the 10%-rule might infringe the 
freedom of establishment.114 However, the Swedish Court concluded that the 10%-rule does 
not pose an obstacle to the freedom of establishment as, with Lankhorst-Hohorst in mind, the 
taxation of the corresponding interest income in Sweden is not required.115 But as the 
reasoning is based on Oy AA116 and Schempp117, whose relevance for such rules can be 
questioned, without even considering Thin Cap Group, the value of these rulings for interest 
deduction is rather questionable.118 As a matter of course the Swedish government supports 
the importance of these favourable rulings for the current rules.119 The European Commission 
on the other hand is not convinced by the 2011 rulings. Even though, as pointed out by the 
Swedish Court, the Swedish rules do not directly discriminate by differentiating between 
residents and non-residents, it is clear since Lankhorst-Hohorst that indirect discrimination 
also restricts the freedom of establishment.120 
The Commission has received complaints about indirect discrimination of cross-border 
groups. It is in line with the discussion in literature and the Swedish Supreme Administrative 
Court’s rulings that the 10%-rule is problematic due to its practical effect on non-resident 
affiliated companies. Under the Swedish rules interest payments to domestic companies, with 
the exception of investment companies and municipalities, are always deductible according to 
the 10%-rule as they are taxable to Swedish corporate income tax at 22%.121 In Lankhorst-
Hohorst discrimination was based on different treatment of the interest paying subsidiaries 
based on the residency of their parent company.122 Just like in Lankhorst-Hohorst some 
domestic companies are also treated differently, but in practice essentially interest paid to 
non-resident creditors is affected.123 In practice for example especially Swedish debtors with 
Belgian creditors are affected, whereas only a minor number of Swedish companies are 
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affected.124 The Swedish government defends that any differences in cross-border situations 
are caused by the differences in Member States’ legislation for received payments and thus, 
would not be discriminatory.125 However, the ECJ case law only goes so far as the Member 
State, here Sweden, cannot be required to take into account disparities arising from 
particularities of another Member States’ legislation.126 This is however not the case with the 
Swedish rules and therefore the government’s argument is not very strong and convincing. 
Moreover the government does not agree with the Commission’s understanding that in 
practice only non-resident creditors are affected as contrary to the German rules in Lankhorst-
Hohorst the Swedish rules do not even indirectly require that for the 10%-rule the interest 
income is taxed in Sweden. Sweden also points to the counter-exception that interests are 
despite not fulfilling the 10%-rule deductible, if the interest payments are motivated by sound 
business reasons.127 However, it is questionable in how far the tax authorities in practice 
might accept any business reasons despite a low tax rate leading to a tax benefit for the group. 
The government on the other hand claims that no different treatment between resident and 
non-resident companies is applied upon assessment whether a transaction is economically 
justified.128 But Swedish companies taking up loans from foreign affiliated companies are 
more likely to be required to prove that the corresponding interest income is hypothetically 
taxed at 10% in the hands of the beneficial owner. Additionally it has to be proven that the 
group does not obtain a substantial tax advantage. Even though certain administrative 
constraints are acceptable under EU law, it can be questioned if they are unnecessarily strict 
on companies with foreign debtors. It can also be questioned why the hypothetical test is of 
relevance if it can be proved that the effective taxation of interest income exceeds 10%. 
Although the 10%-rule leads to a general presumption of abuse, the Swedish rules allow in 
line with Thin Cap Group that the debtor can provide economic justification for loans from 
residents in low-tax jurisdictions. The Commission also argues that it appears unlikely that the 
tax authorities consider domestic intra-group loans being motivated by significant tax 
benefits.129 Swedish group companies do not need to employ interest payments to shift profits 
between domestic companies to benefit from tax benefits and immediate cash-flow 
advantages as Swedish tax law provides for the group contribution scheme. 
In case of discrimination, the Swedish government states that the measure is justified by 
balanced allocation of taxing powers and prevention of tax avoidance.130 However, under the 
tax avoidance justification, as in Thin Cap Group, the rules have to be specifically targeted at 
preventing tax avoidance and only apply to wholly artificial arrangements to be proportional. 
The proportionality of the Swedish rules is questionable as minor tax reasons in themselves 
can already lead to non-deductibility of interest expenses. This is not in line with ECJ case 
law which clearly refers to wholly artificial arrangements and does not require that 
arrangements are primarily motivated by business purpose but have to be non-artificial. Even 
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though tax purposes cannot be seen as business purposes, tax advantages cannot in themselves 
presuppose abusive transactions.131 According to the ECJ, deduction for interest payments to 
affiliated companies cannot be denied if the foreign recipient is a genuinely economically 
active establishment, irrespective of taxation in the creditor’s state.132 Although the business 
purpose counter exceptions try to exclude economically justifiable transactions from the scope 
of the interest deduction limitation rule, they are not as appropriate as they should be, as will 
be discussed in this paper. As mentioned before, Eurowings makes it clear that taxpayers can 
profit from taxing differences between Member States unless they set up artificial 
arrangements.133 The Swedish rules even disallow deduction of interest expenses at arm’s 
length when they are not primarily economically motivated.134 Therefore the Swedish rules 
are stricter than what can be drawn from case law.135  
The Commission also criticized that no administrative guidance has been given on several 
issues which leads to uncertainty. However, legal uncertainty is not an issue for an EU law 
compliance analysis. On the one hand have complaints been raised about the burden of proof, 
as the taxpayer bears the burden to prove that a transaction has to at least 75% been motivated 
by business purposes whereas the tax authorities do not have to provide evidence of abuse.136 
In the proportionality analysis in SIAT137 the ECJ did not accept that the burden of proof was 
shifted to the taxpayer.138 But the rules are in line with Cadbury Schweppes, where the ECJ 
decided that the resident taxpayer is in the best position to provide evidence for non-abuse.139 
Another discriminatory feature of the Swedish rules is newly added yield tax exception. It is 
rather obvious that a resident debtor is in comparable situation if he is paying interest to a 
resident pension fund and a non-resident pension fund. Although the rules in theory allow the 
deduction of interest payment to affiliated non-resident pension funds, it favours in practice 
primarily resident pension funds as non-resident pension funds are required to be taxed at the 
same or higher rate and similarly to the “very particular Swedish yield tax system” 140. 
Overall are the responses of the government not very convincing as they are not well funded. 
In line with the Commission, several problems regarding EU law compliance were pointed 
out. Primarily the indirect discrimination in practice of the 10% rule is likely to infringe the 
freedom of establishment. Although it is argued that the discrimination can be justified by the 
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need to prevent tax avoidance and the balancing allocation of taxing powers,141 the Swedish 
interest deduction limitation rules also face problems regarding their proportionality under EU 
law, in case of justification. 
3.3 EU Law Compatibility of the German Rules 
The compliance of the German interest barrier with EU law also has been questioned.142 
Although the German interest deduction limitation rules do not directly distinguish between 
resident and non-residents, the freedom of establishment might nevertheless be infringed by 
hidden discrimination. The literature seems to be of the consistent opinion that the favourable 
treatment of the domestic fiscal unity under the non-affiliation exemption indirectly 
discriminates non-residents companies and thus infringes the freedom of establishment.143 
Under the non-affiliation exemption, companies that do not or only partially belong to a group 
are exempted from the application of the interest deduction limitation rule.144 Problematic 
with regard to EU law is that companies that form a German fiscal unity for tax purposes 
(Organschaft) are regarded as a single business for the purpose of the non-affiliation 
exemption.145 The problem arises as the eligibility for the fiscal unity was primarily limited to 
domestic companies leading the European Commission to initiate an infringement procedure 
against Germany.146 As a reaction, amendments of the German fiscal unity were passed on 
20 February 2013 to broaden the scope for EU and EEA resident companies.147 It is yet to see 
in how far the amendments actually remove the discrimination of non-resident companies for 
eligibility of the fiscal unity and by extension of the non-affiliation exemption for the German 
interest deduction limitation rules. The exemption is therefore in practice, at least under the 
fiscal unity regime before the amendments, not available to the same extent for multinational 
groups with non-resident companies. A group with all group companies organised under a 
fiscal unity can avoid application of the interest barrier at all.148 In addition is the income of 
the fiscal unity according to sec. 15 para. 3 GCITA consolidated which increases the EBITDA 
and thus the amount of interest expenses that can be deducted. 
The practical effect that resident companies are subject to more beneficial treatment gave rise 
to serious doubts regarding the EU law compliance of the German interest barrier. But as this 
special feature is set out in the provisions on the fiscal unity (Secs. 14 – 19 GCITA) and does 
not form part of the interest deduction limitation rules per se, it is more likely that any EU law 
problem of the interest deduction limitation rules will be removed once the German fiscal 
                                                 
141
 Finansdepartementet, EU Pilot 4437/13/TAXU – Sweden, 20 March 2013, p. 14 and M Hilling (n. 30), 
pp. 824 – 825. 
142
 E.g. A van den Berg van Saparoea, ’Optimizing the Interest Deduction Rules – A Never-Ending Story’, 
European Taxation, vol. 49, no. 1, 2009, p. 9, retrieved 14 March 2013, IBFD Tax Research Platform and 
K von Brocke and E G Perez, (n. 10), p. 34. 
143
 R Eicke and W Kessler (n. 54), p. 266, T Müller-Duttiné and M P Scheunemann (n. 55), p. 521, 
K von Brocke and E G Perez (n. 10), p. 34 and C P Knöller (n. 1), p. 328. 
144
 Sec. 4h para. 2 (b) GITA. 
145
 Sec. 15 (3) GCITA. 
146
 European Commission v Germany, IP/12/283, Commission refers Germany to Court Over Tax Treatment of 
Group Companies, 22 March 2012, retrieved 4 April 2013, Case 2008/4909, http://ec.europa.eu. 
147
 Bundessteuerblatt I 2013, p. 192 and secs. 14 – 19 GCITA. 
148
 R Eicke and W Kessler (n. 54), p. 266, T Müller-Duttiné and M P Scheunemann (n. 55), p. 521, A van den 
Berg van Saparoea (n. 142), p. 8 and C P Knöller (n. 1), pp. 328 – 329. 
18 
 
unity complies with the freedom of establishment and thus will most likely not lead to a 
separate examination of the interest barrier. But so far, the European Commission has not 
withdrawn its reference to the ECJ regarding the infringement of the freedom of establishment 
by the German fiscal unity provisions. 
Further doubts are raised regarding the justification of such indirect discrimination by the 
prevention of tax avoidance or balanced allocation of taxing powers.149 However, more issues 
arise regarding the proportionality of the interest barrier. The German rules are rather unique 
in applying in general to all debt, irrespective of its nature. By this the interest barrier leads to 
double taxation without specifically targeting abusive behaviour.150 This is underlined by the 
fact that the German interest deduction limitation rules do not provide for any safe haven or 
require any arm’s length proof. As pointed out in Cadbury Schweppes anti-abuse measures 
must be limited to tax-driven wholly artificial arrangements. It is argued that the German 
interest barrier is not compatible with EU law in this regard.151 It cannot be denied that the 
scope of the interest barrier is too broad to be proportional under the tax avoidance prevention 
justification.152 However, it is questionable if the German provision any longer can be 
categorized as anti-abuse provision.  
In Thin Cap Group the ECJ decided that thin capitalization rules are only proportional if only 
the amount exceeding arm’s length is non-deductible.153 The de minimis exception of the 
interest barrier, however, follows an “all-or-nothing condition”154 which upon exceeding the 
threshold leads to non-deductibility of all net interest expense under the general rule. The 
interest barrier might therefore not be proportional, assuming that it would be justifiable. In 
Thin Cap Group unnecessary administrative constraints were also not accepted under the 
proportionality analysis.155 Even though the counter exceptions lead to rather high and 
complex demands regarding the burden of proof for harmful shareholder debt-financing, 
especially for large corporate groups156, whereas the tax authorities are not required to prove 
abuse157, it can be argued to qualify as being necessary. It is rather difficult to assess what the 
ECJ would consider unnecessary administrative constraints. Another part of the rules that 
might pose unnecessary administrative constraints on the taxpayer is the equity comparison 
which requires that the financial statements to be submitted have to be set up in German or in 
a certified translation in addition to necessary adjustments.158  
In summary it seems unlikely that the German interest deduction limitation rules will be 
subject to a case before the ECJ, unless regarding their proportionality as anti-abuse 
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provision, as their indirect discrimination stems from the allegedly non-compliant fiscal unity 
regime. The infringement of the fiscal unity regime has in itself already been referred to the 
ECJ by the European Commission and has lead to small reform of the fiscal unity regime in 
2013.159 
4. Appropriateness and Proportionality Analysis 
To enable a proper critical comparison, it has to be assessed in how far the interest deduction 
rules are appropriate to fulfil their purpose as both anti-abuse provisions and measures to 
prevent tax base erosion. 
4.1 Appropriateness and Proportionality of the Swedish Rules 
The Swedish set of interest deduction limitation rules are in their substance an anti-avoidance 
legislation that targets the circumventing of taxation by debt financing with a focus on intra-
group loans and back-to-back loans. However, the government stresses that the rules do not 
primarily aim at preventing tax avoidance but at preventing an erosion of the Swedish tax 
base.160 The basic problem is the incentives for intra-group debt created by the tax-beneficial 
treatment of debt. Already in its preparatory work before the implementation of the interest 
deduction limitation rules in 2009, tax planning in connection with acquisition of 
shareholdings in non-affiliated companies and third party loans was identified as a potential 
serious threat to the Swedish tax base.161 
Assessing the appropriateness of the Swedish rules, it has to be considered in how far they can 
be circumvented and in how far they apply to non-abusive arrangements The relevant issue is 
to assess how appropriate the Swedish rules are for protecting the Swedish tax base by 
targeting tax avoidance and in how far sound business arrangements are affected by the rules. 
The main problem regarding the appropriateness of the Swedish rules is their legal uncertainty 
for both the taxpayers and the tax authorities. Especially from the viewpoint of the tax 
authorities the tax base is not predictable and it is more difficult for them to assess whether 
arrangements are abusive and therefore under the law enable the application of the interest 
deduction limitation rules which in turn increase the tax base. Uncertainty results from several 
imprecise and unclear terms that lead to a demand for guidance, especially on the 
interpretation of the exceptions.162 The rules provide for two exceptions to avoid as much as 
possible that debt financing with sound business reasons is affected.163 It is important with 
regard to appropriateness and proportionality that the rules in order to increase the tax base as 
an anti-abuse provision only apply to abusive arrangements. In ch. 24 para. 10a SITA it is 
unclear what is meant by ‘substantial influence’ (väsentligt inflytande). Although the 
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government made it clear that this intends to cover shareholdings just under 50%, it is unclear 
in which other ways than shareholdings such substantial influence can be exercised. 
According to the government this general design and imprecise terminology intends to cover 
that not all situations can be foreseen. Although this is a comprehensible reasoning, this leads 
to uncertainty for any tax planning activity of the taxpayer.164 Especially companies with 
shareholdings just under 50% cannot predict whether deduction of interest expenses will be 
limited and such companies are more likely to be subject to more thorough assessment by the 
tax authorities trying to prove substantial influence.  
However, even more considerable uncertainty is created by the impreciseness of the 
exceptions. An important factor of uncertainty is the assessment of business reasons of an 
arrangement for the purpose of the exceptions. The exception rules, i.e. the 10%-rule and the 
yield tax rule as well as the business purpose rule, are implemented to exclude certain 
transactions from the general rule’s scope that disallow deduction of interest expenses.165 
However, it is questionable in how far these exceptions can ensure that the interest deduction 
limitation rules are targeted at artificial and abusive arrangements. Under the 10%-rule a 
counter-exception disallows the application of the exception from the general rule when the 
underlying debt is motivated by obtaining a tax benefit for the group.166 The burden of proof 
that an arrangement has mainly business motives lies with the taxpayer, whereas the tax 
authorities have to show that wrong information was given or that an arrangement that fulfils 
the formal conditions of the 10%-rule has been entered to obtain a significant tax benefit for 
the group.167 As already mentioned, did the ECJ not accept the shift of the burden of proof on 
the taxpayer in SIAT.168 The government tries to defend the shift of the burden of proof by 
pointing out differences between the SIAT case and the Swedish rules.169 However, this 
‘reversed safety value’ is pointed out to be the weakest point of the rules regarding their 
appropriateness as it is very difficult for the Swedish tax authorities to determine whether or 
not an arrangement has a sound business purpose.170 
Additionally are the rules criticized for being unforeseeable and leading to legal uncertainty 
because the tax authorities are entitled to change their tax assessment for several years.171 This 
cannot be considered acceptable with regard to well-targeted anti-abuse legislation. It might 
also discourage investments in Sweden which indirectly also erodes the tax base. 
Not only the tax authorities might have problems gaining all information necessary, but the 
taxpayers as well when he has to prove that the hypothetical 10%-test has been fulfilled. As 
not the effective taxation, which could rather easily be derived from the annual tax returns, is 
decisive but the hypothetical taxation, this requires certain knowledge of a different 
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jurisdiction’s tax laws. Such an assessment of the hypothetical taxation by the Swedish 
taxpayers also requires cooperation which might not be given with all group companies and is 
even less likely with regard to creditors of back-to-back loans.. As the tax authorities’ reports 
have shown, the 10%-test leads to considerably higher compliance costs which should be 
avoided for principally sound business arrangements.172 For the 10%-rule it is decisive to 
determine who the beneficial owner is. The reasoning behind this requirement is to prevent 
structures where the interest income is passed through intermediary companies to a company 
in a low-tax jurisdiction.173 However, the term ‘beneficial owner’ is problematic and widely 
discussed in literature. It is stated in commentaries that not only the legal right to the interest 
income is decisive, but the economic beneficiary who enjoys the economic advantages.174 In 
complex group structures this might be rather difficult to establish, for both the tax authorities 
and the taxpayer. The 10%-rule is in its basic form a very interesting approach from an EU 
law perspective as it is not discriminatory per se as a certain tax arbitrage is accepted as being 
not harmful despite eroding the Swedish tax base. The issue is, however, which limit is 
appropriate and that such a fixed percentage entails similar problems as fixed debt-equity 
ratios.175 
The business-purpose exception allows deduction even though the 10%-rule is not fulfilled, if 
the underlying debt, and, if applicable, the acquisition is principally motivated by sound 
business reasons.176 According to the government, debt and acquisition are regarded as 
principally business driven under ch. 24 paras. 10d and 10e SITA if the business purposes 
amount to more than 75% of the overall reasons behind the debt and the acquisition. Tax 
reasons are not being accepted as business reasons.177 In its rulings rendered on 30 November 
2011 the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court differentiated between organisational and 
business purposes and considered organisational purposes not qualifying as business reasons 
for the purpose of the interest deduction limitation rules.178 Therefore can business purposes 
be very difficult to prove, especially for intra-group acquisitions of shareholdings.179 From an 
appropriateness viewpoint this can be considered positively with regard to targeting abusive 
arrangements where fictional business reasons are hard to fabricate due to the strict 
requirement. However, the rules are so rigid that non-abusive arrangements are also affected 
and have to face difficulties in proving their commercial justification. It is also quite 
contradicting that the taxation level of the interest income has an impact on the assessment of 
the business purpose of the underlying debt,180 although the business-purpose exception is 
meant to cover cases of economically justifiable arrangements that do not fulfil the 10%-rule. 
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Moreover might it prove impossible in practice to determine whether a debt was taken up in 
order to finance an acquisition or whether a third party provides a back-to-back loan.181 It is 
not clear which reasons are accepted as business reasons which further complicates legitimate 
tax planning activities for the taxpayer. It is furthermore questionable how reasons are to be 
quantified and to be weighed against each other. The preparatory work indicates that an 
analysis has to be made on a case-by-case basis.182 The terminology used (skuldförhållandet) 
indicates that the situation of both the lender and the borrower are to be assessed.183 A case-
by-case analysis implies arbitrary treatment depending on tax authorities’ random assessment 
not supported by any guidelines. Such legal uncertainty is a high burden on a taxpayer with 
regard to his planning activities and prediction of financial funds. Furthermore is arbitrary 
treatment likely to be disadvantageous for foreign investments and opens the possibility for 
corruption of tax authorities.  
In addition the taxpayer is required to show that the financing could not instead have been 
arranged by way of contribution.184 Upon assessing this aspect, even indirect parent 
companies and other group companies have to be taken into consideration. This in itself 
presents a heavy administrative burden for large corporate groups.185 Another major issue 
with the interest deduction limitation rules is the uncertainty they create by potentially 
applying retrospectively. As loans and acquisitions entered into before the introduction or 
amendments of the rules are also included in the scope of the rules, they are subject to a 
stricter assessment of their commercial justification as when they were entered into. It is 
questionable in how far this amount to retrospective legislation.186  
Overall is the terminology used in the Swedish rules rather vague and it is a hard task even for 
non-abusive taxpayers to fulfil.187 Regarding legal certainty it is questionable how both the 
taxpayer and the tax authorities are, on a regular basis, supposed to reach the same 
conclusion, especially in complex situations, without permanently relying on decisions of 
national tax courts.188 The rules can also be considered as being overly strict as they do not 
provide for a de minimis exemption which would considerably lower the compliance cost on 
small businesses and no safe haven under which taxpayers with considerate certainty can rely 
on the deduction of their interest expenses. On the one hand this makes it harder on 
arrangements with sound business purposes but on the other hand it is more appropriate in 
preventing tax avoidance scheme designed to abuse any safe haven. 
4.2 Appropriateness and Proportionality of the German Rules 
It has been doubted whether the German interest barrier is an appropriate anti-avoidance rule 
preventing the erosion of the tax base. The problem, it is argued, is that the rules go far 
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beyond what was intended by the legislator. The rules are being criticized for their broad 
scope which would affect unnecessarily many companies.189 Due to the broad scope, the 
German rules in general do not differentiate based on the kind of debt, i.e. whether the 
creditor is an affiliated company, a third party or even a bank. The rules also do not provide 
for a safe haven accepting higher indebtedness based on the arm’s length of a loan. However, 
the amount of interest expenses, a company’s equity ratio and potential shareholder debt 
financing have to be considered. The question is how appropriate the German interest 
deduction limitation rules are for securing the domestic tax base and whether tax avoidance is 
combated at the price of sound business loans. 
With the broad scope Germany intended to make the determination of abusive financing 
structure more objective. However, the rules’ scope might be broader than necessary for 
preventing tax avoidance. In addition the taxpayer cannot rebut the avoidance presumption.190 
But, here again, it has to be pointed out that the German rules might no longer be a classical 
anti-avoidance legislation that restricts deduction of interest expenses, but more a new 
approach towards disallowing deduction of interest payments in general to achieve 
assimilation with equity and only allowing deductibility under certain circumstances. 
The German rule is one of the so-called EBITDA-rules as the deductibility of interest 
expenses depends on a company’s EBITDA. At first sight the flexibility and adaptability of 
this approach is intriguing. EBITDA is a figure from the financial statements, whereas the 
German rules are orientated at the taxable EBITDA which can significantly deviate in some 
cases, e.g. for holding companies. Due to the almost full tax exemption (95%) of capital gains 
and dividends, holding companies usually have a rather low taxable EBITDA. Another 
example is a company with foreign permanent establishment whose income is usually due to 
double tax treaties tax exempt and therefore not contained in the taxable EBITDA.191 Or 
companies which are incurring high research and development expenses which are not 
considered in the taxable EBITDA.192 A problem is that EBITDA is a rather volatile figure on 
which the deductibility of usually relatively constant interest expenses depends.193 Contrary to 
fixed debt-equity ratios, it is rather difficult to predict the deductibility of interest expenses 
under a dynamic EBITDA-rule.194 The argumentation that the recovery of financially trouble 
companies is aggravated by the EBITDA-approach195 has to be disregarded, as the effect of 
the volatility of EBITDA is damped by the EBITDA carry-forward. This is helpful for 
companies who only have temporarily lower EBITDAs. For companies who are in long-term 
financial troubles, the limited deductibility of interest expenses is most likely only an indirect 
burden by not increasing the tax loss carry-forwards. Only if the earnings before the deduction 
of interests (and depreciation and amortization) are negative, non-deductibility of net interest 
expenses is given and will therefore not impose a tax payment on the taxpayer. Taxpayers 
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may also increase their EBITDA, e.g. by a step-up in value or by realizing hidden reserves.196 
However, such behaviour grants an earlier interest deduction and thus temporary benefits, but 
in turn also increases the tax base which is compliant with the legislator’s intention. 
The German interest deduction limitation rules contain three exceptions to distinguish 
between excessive debt-financing and sound business financing. Generally small and 
medium-sized companies, unaffiliated companies and affiliated companies with a group-
average equity ratio are exempted from the scope of the interest deduction limitation rules.197 
The rationale of the de minimis exception is the assumption that small and medium-sized 
enterprises do not need to be targeted by anti-abuse legislation due to their lower impact on 
the German tax base and as they are less likely to set up cross-border arrangements. Even 
though a certain threshold is in principle to be seen as positive as it relieves smaller 
businesses from unnecessary compliance costs, it is questionable whether the threshold might 
be set too high. The threshold was initially set at EUR 1m and was only intended to be 
increased temporarily due to the financial crisis.198 Tax avoidance is not presupposed unless 
the net interest expenses exceed EUR 3m with a theoretical corporate income tax value of 
EUR 450,000.199 Assuming an interest rate between 5% and 10% and no interest income, this 
amounts to debt financing between EUR 30m and EUR 60m. It is questionable in how far 
companies with balance sheet sum exceeding at least EUR 30m, plus equity and provisions, 
really need to be assumed to be small and medium enterprises not engaging in abusive 
arrangements. A lower threshold would also reduce incentives for group companies to 
circumvent the interest barrier by splitting their debt financing over several businesses. For 
circumvention of the interest barrier, it might even make sense for groups to abolish a fiscal 
unity. The de minimis exception is even more attractive for tax planning strategies as the 
counter-exception for harmful shareholder debt-financing does not apply.200 
Another opportunity for tax planning is provided by the non-group affiliation exemption, as 
the fiscal unity is regarded as one business. As already discussed, was this opportunity so far 
limited to domestic groups and potentially infringed EU law. An opening of the fiscal unity 
regime for EU resident companies might in turn discourage the German legislator to hold on 
to the non-group affiliation exemption for the fiscal unity. For determining the existence of a 
group the facts at the end of the last fiscal year are assessed, unless a company is newly 
incorporated.201 Therefore a newly formed group can benefit from full deductibility of interest 
expenses under the non-group affiliation exemption during the first fiscal year. However, this 
is a one-time-only possibility. 
The most relevant exemption for multinational groups is the equity comparison. However 
doubts are casted on its effectiveness. A study202 upon introduction of the interest deduction 
limitation rules has shown that tax planning activities with regard to the group-wide equity 
ratio are not very relevant to taxpayers. Usually adjustments have to be made to the financial 
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statements to determine the decisive equity ratios, resulting in high compliance and 
monitoring costs. Obstacles of practical and conceptual nature significantly restrict the 
application of the escape clause and it is therefore relatively resistant to tax planning.203 But it 
has to be highlighted that instead of relying on a fixed equity ratio, the approach provides 
flexibility to adapt to the situation of every group. 
The additional restrictions on corporations regarding harmful shareholder debt-financing are 
in principal a good approach to combat tax avoidance. In many cases it leads to unsuccessful 
application of the former two exceptions.204 As any excessive interest payment from a non-
group shareholder affects the whole group, high compliance and monitoring costs are incurred 
upon recalculation business plans and analysing group financing structures.205  
The suitability of the exemptions, the low amount of deductible interest expenses and the high 
level of complexity are among the issues that are criticized by tax practitioners.206 It is argued 
that the exemptions are relatively resistant against any tax planning, which on the one hand 
poses an obstacle to multinational groups, but on the other hand is a sign of appropriateness of 
the rules.207 A study showed that three different tax planning approaches were considered by 
German companies: adjusting the interest expenses, e.g. by export of expenses to other high-
tax jurisdictions or import of interest income or substitution by other financial instruments not 
subject to the interest barrier, adjusting the EBITDA, e.g. by shifting income to Germany, or 
adjusting the group structure. The German rules, hence, actually create incentives for tax 
planning alternatives that increase the German tax base. As intended by the legislator the 
German interest deduction limitation rules can indeed, at least partially, counter-finance the 
tax rate reduction.208 Despite the reduction of the corporate tax rate, Germany is still a high-
tax jurisdiction whose attractiveness for international investments and multinational groups is 
negatively affected by the strict and rigid interest deduction limitation rules. It can be doubted 
whether the attractiveness has improved at all compared to the old thin capitalization regime. 
Therefore the appropriateness in preventing tax base erosion might be made at the cost of 
discouraging investors.209 
Overall appears the German interest barrier not to be a well-targeted anti avoidance provision 
and is a considerable obstacle for multinational groups operating in several tax jurisdictions, 
high leveraged companies, holding companies and other companies with low taxable 
EBITDA, certain unprofitable companies and growing start-up companies. However, 
financially sound companies should be able to deduct their interest expenses despite 
potentially high compliance costs.210 
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5. Comparison 
The capping of interest deductibility instead of targeting the capital structure by traditional 
thin capitalization rules has growing attractiveness as the implementation of such interest 
deduction limitation rules in Spain and Portugal shows. The introduction of the rules in both 
Sweden and Germany was motivated by the legislators’ intent to counter-finance a 
simultaneous reduction of the corporate income tax rate.211 The German rules, however, seem 
more appropriate in regard to increasing the domestic tax base by creating incentives for tax 
planning that might actually increase the taxable net interest income in Germany. Sweden on 
the other hand accepts a certain tax arbitrage and therefore does not give incentives to shift 
interest income to Sweden and interest expenses out of Sweden.  
In comparison to traditional thin capitalization rules, both approaches avoid the complexity of 
reclassifying interest expenses. Such interest deduction limitation rules seem to be more 
appropriate as they do not address the capital structure of a company but directly target 
interest payments. They also avoid the problem of which debt-equity ratio is appropriate for 
all kinds of businesses.212 However, both approaches have certain fixed thresholds, i.e. the 
10%-rule in Sweden and in Germany the de minimis exemption and the 10% threshold for 
harmful shareholder debt financing. The problem with fixed thresholds is that they can be 
used for tax planning strategies. In Sweden, for example, can companies take up loans 
especially from creditors that are taxed on the interest income just above 10% and within 
German groups interest expenses can be split over several companies to benefit each from the 
EUR 3m threshold. 
The main concerns regarding the appropriateness and proportionality of the Swedish interest 
deduction limitations rules for their pursued purpose were raised about the business purpose 
tests, both in the 10%-rule and the business purpose rule. The German rules avoid this by not 
having an arm’s length standard, which would not even make sense as the German rules also 
apply to third party loans and hence, a third party comparison is unnecessary as such loans are 
assumed to conform to the market rate.213 As a transfer pricing analysis is not required in 
Germany, the complexity and costs of such an analysis are avoided, which benefits especially 
non-abusive taxpayers.214 However, the German rules provide for a different safe haven in 
form of a minimum threshold. As long as the threshold is not exceeded, the strict interest 
deduction limitation rules are not applicable. However, the threshold exception is not a tax 
allowance, but upon exceeding the threshold by EUR 1, the interest barrier is fully applicable 
to all net interest expenses and is therefore overly strict.215 Such a de minimis exemption is 
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more favourable for small and medium businesses that usually do not have the resources for 
the compliance cost necessary to prove arm’s length of their arrangements. On the other hand 
is the avoidance presumption of the German rules not rebuttable. But the Swedish rules also 
only offer relatively strict arm’s length standards as a minor tax benefit can already disallow 
interest deductibility. 
Another characteristic that both set of rules share is that they do not only apply in accordance 
with the size of shareholdings but also to shareholdings giving factual influence e.g. control 
over the capital or the finance and business policy of the company. The Swedish rules are 
stricter after their recent amendments, whereas under the German rules it would be possible 
that equally controlled joint-ventures that are not fully consolidated under the group account 
can apply the non-affiliation exception.216 The advantage of taking into account factual 
influence is that it prevents circumvention of the interest deduction rules by amended 
shareholdings just below 50%, but as already elaborated is certain legal uncertainty created. 
The approaches in both Germany and Sweden are rather complex. Sweden has chosen a 
specific rule targeting certain tax planning.217 This, however, tackles the problem of thin 
capitalization only partially and gives way to other forms of financing to circumvent taxation 
in Sweden. EBITDA-rules are not focused solely on tax avoidance as they are generally 
designed. They even disallow interest deductibility if sound business reasons are given. As the 
rules are linked to the financial results, they can have negative effects in economic crisis.218 
The German approach however manages to buffer the negative effects by implementing 
EBITDA carry-forwards and interest carry-forwards. The advantage of a general rule 
disallowing interest deductibility is that it paves the way for a future alignment of debt and 
equity. With the objective of the Swedish Companies’ Committee to align the tax treatment of 
debt and equity financing,219 such an EBITDA approach can be interesting due to its general 
disallowance of deduction of interest expenses from all sources. An EBITDA-approach is 
flexible, whereas the Swedish rules with the fixed 10%-rule are relatively inflexible. As with 
fixed debt-equity ratios, this leads the situation that tax planning is adjusted to the rules and 
companies will export interest income to jurisdictions with taxation just above 10%.220 
Although the flexible EBITDA-approach makes it hard to plan sound business financing, it 
also impedes abusive tax planning. Both approaches make it hard to predict interest 
deductibility due to their exemptions. As was pointed out in the analysis of the 
appropriateness of the German rules, one reason that restricts predictability is the reliance on 
the special taxable EBITDA which is based on country-specific tax accounting rules. The 
complexity of the rules could be reduced, and in turn the predictability increased, when an 
EBITDA approach is based on the accounting EBITDA as e.g. in Italy.221 From the point of 
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view of the taxpayer it is positive that the German rules contrary to the Swedish rules do not 
per se lead to economic double taxation, as interest deduction is only temporarily limited 
thanks to the interest carry-forward, unless a major ownership share in the company is being 
transferred.222 Although both rules still allow circumvention by tax planning to some extent, 
the German rules encourage tax planning activities that may even increase the German tax 
base at the cost of other tax jurisdictions. 
6. Conclusion 
Case law has shown that domestic thin capitalization rules are often discriminatory if they in 
practice primarily apply to interest payments made to foreign companies. As was shown in the 
EU law compatibility analysis do the Swedish rules have serious problems with indirect 
discrimination, whereas the German rules’ main problem lies in the fiscal unity exception. 
Implementation of an EBITDA-approach similar to the German rules in Sweden should not 
raise concerns regarding EU law, as the Swedish system does not provide for a discriminatory 
fiscal unity regime like Germany. Combined with a minimum threshold to relieve small 
taxpayers from the burden of high compliance costs as well as the non-affiliation exception 
and the harmful shareholder debt financing counter-exception the approach would target the 
same tax avoidance schemes as intended by the Swedish legislator. This can be underlined by 
the statement of the Swedish government during the on-going Commission inquiry that a 
minor amount should not be considered to constitute a significant tax benefit.223 Despite the 
equity comparison leading to substantial compliance costs, it functions as a rebuttable 
avoidance presumption which always incurs certain compliance costs. Although it can be 
argued that a business-purpose test is more appropriate as a rebuttable avoidance presumption, 
it also entails arbitrary treatment by the tax authorities which is avoided by an equity 
comparison. 
If the Sweden legislator intends to introduce a de minimis exception to the interest deduction 
limitation rules, it is advisable that the threshold is kept rather low. Moreover it should be 
considered whether a de minimis exception should function as an all-or-nothing condition or 
instead apply the interest deduction limitation rules only to the exceeding amount. The 
challenge would be to find a threshold that is high enough to protect small businesses from 
unbearable compliance cost but not as high as to create incentives to split interest expenses 
across group companies. 
It is furthermore advisable that detailed guidelines on terminology used should be published 
to ensure higher legal certainty for the taxpayers. Financing, especially for multinational 
groups, can be very complex and depends on consistent tax rules.224 Both, the tax authorities 
and the taxpayers benefit from predictability of their income, i.e. tax revenue or profits. This 
can only be reached by clear formulated tax provisions. This is in line with the principle of 
legal certainty.225 
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Germany has relatively consistent rules as it has not made any substantial changes in its 
interest barrier since its introduction in 2008, but only some amendments to make the rules 
less rigid, whereas the Swedish rules have undergone several amendments restricting the 
deductibility of interest expenses even further. For Sweden it is important to introduce a stable 
and consistent interest deduction limitation rules after the research of the Companies’ 
Committee has been presented. The aim of the Companies’ Committee to align the tax 
treatment of debt and equity should be welcomed226 with regard to increasing the domestic tax 
base. Taxpayers are generally entitled to arrange their affairs in the best way possible to profit 
from taxing differences, as long as their arrangements are not artificial.227 Therefore 
taxpayers, especially multinational groups, will always try to reduce their effective taxation. 
This in turn requires the legislator to close loopholes by constant improvement of their rules, 
while also facing the challenge to achieve legal certainty and encourage investments.228 
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